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Abstract
Background: Even though electronic prescribing systems are widely advocated as one of the most effective
means of improving patient safety, they may also introduce new risks that are not immediately obvious. Through
the study of specific incidents related to the processes involved in the administration of medication, we sought to
find out if the prescribing system had unintended consequences in creating new errors. The focus of this study
was a large acute hospital in the Midlands in the United Kingdom, which implemented a Prescribing, Information
and Communication System (PICS).
Methods: This exploratory study was based on a survey of routinely collected medication incidents over five
months. Data were independently reviewed by two of the investigators with a clinical pharmacology and nursing
background respectively, and grouped into broad types: sociotechnical incidents (related to human interactions
with the system) and non-sociotechnical incidents. Sociotechnical incidents were distinguished from the others
because they occurred at the point where the system and the professional intersected and would not have
occurred in the absence of the system. The day of the week and time of day that an incident occurred were
tested using univariable and multivariable analyses. We acknowledge the limitations of conducting analyses of data
extracted from incident reports as it is widely recognised that most medication errors are not reported and may
contain inaccurate data. Interpretation of results must therefore be tentative.
Results: Out of a total of 485 incidents, a modest 15% (n = 73) were distinguished as sociotechnical issues and
thus may be unique to hospitals that have such systems in place. These incidents were further analysed and
subdivided into categories in order to identify aspects of the context which gave rise to adverse situations and
possible risks to patient safety. The analysis of sociotechnical incidents by time of day and day of week indicated a
trend for increased proportions of these types of incidents occurring on Sundays.
Conclusion: Introducing an electronic prescribing system has the potential to give rise to new types of risks to
patient safety. Being aware of these types of errors is important to the clinical and technical implementers of such
systems in order to, where possible, design out unintended problems, highlight training requirements, and revise
clinical practice protocols.
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Patient safety is defined as the avoidance, prevention,
and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stem-
ming from the process of health care [1]. Preventing
medical errors is one of the most important aspects of
providing safe and high quality care within health care
systems.
Leape [2] defines error as an unintended act of either
commission or omission that did not achieve its
intended outcome. Significant research has been under-
taken over the past few decades in studying issues
around errors and adverse events. The delivery of medi-
cation to patients is the end result of a complex process
comprising many steps, each vulnerable to error. There-
fore in the acute hospital setting, preventing medical,
and in particular medication errors, through the use of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is
widely advocated as one of the most effective means of
achieving such improvements [3,4]. Anticipated benefits
include, for example, the reduction of legibility errors
thus making prescribing safer, the increase in efficiency
through eliminating lost notes or charts, improvements
in communication between care providers and the
increase in capacity at a time of workforce and financial
constraint [4].
There is growing evidence from countries such as the
United States where the use of health care ICT has a
longer history, that even though electronic prescribing
systems with inbuilt clinical decision support may con-
tain features that protect against error and thus enhance
patient safety [5], they may also introduce new risks of
their own that are not always immediately obvious [6].
Some of the issues that have been identified are cogni-
tive overload; loss of overview of the clinical situation;
errors in data entry and retrieval; excessive reliance on
electronically held data; disruptions of established work-
flow patterns and the tendency to infer that data entry
equates to communication within and among health
care teams [7,8]. These new risks are the unintended
and unanticipated consequences associated with the
introduction of the electronic prescribing system. There
is a distinction to be drawn between the unintended and
the unanticipated consequences in that “unintended”
implies lack of purposeful action or causation, while
“unanticipated” means an inability to forecast what
eventually occurred [9]. Unintended errors can be exem-
plified by situations such as picking a wrong option
from a drop down list or typing 100 instead of 10,
which we consider to be akin to a slip which is a failure
of attention leading to inadvertent actions. Lapses are
failures of memory and often occur as a result of dis-
tractions or interruptions, whereas mistakes are caused
by inappropriate clinical reasoning and failures in plan-
ning or problem solving [10]. In purely technological
terms, an unanticipated consequence can occur when
there are incorrect rules within a computer system or
some other technical failure. Furthermore, unanticipated
errors can occur if a user deliberately deviates from the
standard procedures, recommendations or guidelines
thus committing a technical violation [11] often referred
to as a ‘work-around’ when there is a glitch in the way
information systems are used relative to initial inten-
tions [12,13]. While previous studies, predominantly
North American, have produced some promising
insights, given the fundamental differences in health
care delivery, it is likely that they are not easily transfer-
able into the UK context. Understanding the contribu-
tion of health care ICT to improving patient safety as
well as its unanticipated and unintended consequences
in the local and UK context is vital in order to facilitate
the design of interventions at individual, team and orga-
nisational level to mitigate these potential new threats
and thus further improve patient safety.
According to Shekelle and Goldzweig [6], compu-
terised systems should be considered as a complex inter-
vention with four key components: technical, human,
project management, and organisational and cultural
change all of which must be systematically studied.
However, as Greenhalgh et al. [14] conclude in their
extensive review of the literature of electronic patient
records, research has only scratched the surface of what
the introduction of clinical decision support systems
means, at the level of fine-grained detail, for a health
care organisation and the staff and patients who practise
and interact in that setting. We propose an approach
which acknowledges the mutual influence between tech-
nology and its social and organisational context [15,16]
in which research focuses on the sociotechnical aspects
(issues involving the interplay of organisational, indivi-
dual, social and technical components) of patient safety
and risk management in hospitals. New technology is
not simply integrated into current practice and ways of
working, but has a profound impact on organisational
arrangements, professional work, and medical practice.
This social view of technology recognises that individual
systems are anchored to a variety of other practices as
well as broader organisational conditions [17] which we
investigated with respect to this locally developed
system.
The purpose of this study was to explore the types of
possible unintended and unanticipated consequences as
well as the nature of their effects within the sociotechni-
cal and organisational context at an acute hospital. To
date, few hospitals in the UK have implemented a com-
prehensive IT system with the aim of reducing error
and enhancing patient safety, and there is as yet little
knowledge on the implications of such a highly compu-
terised environment for working practices and care
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ing system had unintended consequences in creating
new errors, we accessed the existing risk management
system to collect data in the form of reported incidents
which were related to the medication process (i.e. pre-
scribing, preparation, supply and administration of med-
icines). From a sociotechnical perspective, capturing this
subjective contextual data was useful insofar as we
sought to identify the dynamics between technology and
the social, professional, and cultural environment in
which it was used which in turn can be useful in devel-
oping preventative strategies [18]. However, many inci-
dents may not be reported or may not be reported in
enough detail regarding contributory factors and preced-
ing events [19,20], or may contain inaccurate
information.
Some recent UK based studies [21-23] have investi-
gated medication errors related specifically to electronic
prescribing systems by retrospectively reviewing electro-
nic records for a random selection of patients, or by ret-
rospectively analysing all medication orders generated in
a specified period of time. In contrast, we worked with
the hospital’s risk management team, collecting all med-
ication related clinical incidents, irrespective of their
association with the electronic prescribing system,
reported by hospital staff. Our objectives were to
describe the range of medication incidents reported by
hospital staff, identify the proportion of incidents that
relate to sociotechnical factors and explore the nature
and characteristics of reported sociotechnical incidents.
Based on the fact that clinical incident reports are not
by their nature neutral descriptions when reported by
individual members of health care staff, one of the foci
of our analysis was the manner in which sociotechnical
problems were described and presented in the incident
r e p o r t s ,a n dw h a tv i e w sa n dp e r c e p t i o n sa b o u tt h es y s -
tem they revealed. The study also allowed us to gain an
insight into hospital staff’s views of the system and its
perceived role in mediating or preventing medication
related errors. We did not seek to evaluate the technical
performance of the system or investigate the validity of
concerns expressed by clinical staff related to perceived
technical problems.
Methods
Setting
The focus of this study was an acute hospital in the
West Midlands in the United Kingdom (UK) which has
fully implemented a comprehensive Prescribing, Infor-
mation and Communication System (PICS) and pro-
vided a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of
ICT on patient safety. The PICS system had been devel-
oped locally in collaboration between technical and clin-
ical staff as an electronic prescribing, clinical decision
support and alerting system that supports local working
practices. As such, many of the difficulties associated
with commercially-developed electronic prescribing sys-
tems [6], such as problems of fit with specific workflows
or failure to meet the expectations of both clinical and
managerial staff, had been largely avoided. Decision sup-
port was built into the rules-based system which
included drug-drug interactions, drug-disease contrain-
dications, dose range checking, drug-laboratory warn-
ings, pregnancy / breast feeding / liver and renal
warnings, and some structured orders relevant to local
protocols (e.g. antibiotic prescribing). The system had
been incrementally implemented across the organisation
over a number of years and was well embedded into
clinical practice across the organisation. The electronic
prescribing system was used throughout all inpatient
beds and across all specialties except for theatres, Acci-
dent and Emergency attendances and for the Day case /
Ambulatory care unit, where the expected stay is less
than 24 hours.
Data collection
This study was based on a survey of routinely collected
medication incident reports completed by members of
staff through the hospital’s clinical risk management sys-
t e m .A tt h et i m eo fd a t ac o l l e c t i o n ,t h eh o s p i t a lh a d
introduced software that enabled incident reports to be
submitted online from wards and departments. Roll-out
of the system across the hospital was not complete until
month 3 of data collection. This meant that some of the
early incident reports were completed on paper-based
versions of the same reporting template and sent via the
internal post to the risk management team who manu-
ally entered these data into the new system. Investiga-
tors did not detect any systematic differences in the data
collected from the online or the paper-based systems.
All hospital staff received guidance on incident reporting
through policy and procedural documents requiring
them to report all incidents, including near misses. An
incident was defined as an unplanned or unexpected
event that may or may not lead to injury, damage or
loss to an individual or to the organisation. A near miss
was defined as an event that had the potential to lead to
injury damage or loss, but was prevented. The study
hospital promoted a culture of openness to the report-
ing of incidents and near misses, and a report by the
National Patient Safety Agency showed that it compared
favourably with other organisations in a national cluster
group in relation to medication incident reporting,
based on an examination of patient safety incident
reporting across the country and a comparison with
similar institutions [24]. We only collected data from
incidents that were medication related. The initial time
period of 3 months was extended to 5 months as the
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ally estimated and we required a larger sample of inci-
dents to conduct a statistical analysis. Data were
extracted and collated by one of the investigators on a
weekly basis in collaboration with the hospital’sr i s k
management department. The data had not been pre-
coded. The following information relating to each inci-
dent was recorded by the researcher: hospital site; clini-
cal area; time and date the incident took place; incident
identification number; and the narrative description of
the incident as given by the member of staff making the
report. In all cases, the original words of the reporter
were noted.
Data analysis
The data were entered into a spreadsheet. Each incident
was reviewed independently by two of the investigators
(one of the investigators is a clinical pharmacologist, the
other a registered nurse) in order to identify the inci-
dent’s salient features and allocate it to a broad type
(see below) and to a descriptive category (for example,
related to the supply of medication, the prescribing pro-
cess, or the administration of medicines). Reviewer dis-
agreements were rare; when they occurred incidents
were discussed and disagreements resolved. No further
attempts were made to identify individual or technical
circumstances relating to individual errors. Following
the clinical reviews, the incidents were grouped into
broad types: sociotechnical incidents and non-sociotech-
nical incidents. Sociotechnical incidents were distin-
guished from the other incidents because they were
associated with the human interface and sociotechnical
context of the electronic prescribing system. These inci-
dents occurred at the point where the electronic pre-
scribing system and the health care professional as the
user of the system intersected and would not have
occurred in the absence of the system. The two broad
types of incidents were then broken down into more
specific categories in order to identify the frequency
with which particular problems occurred, using an itera-
tive and inductive process for the categorisation in
order to account for all incidents. Finally, each socio-
technical incident was examined in more detail in order
to study how the incident was presented and described.
We further analysed the sociotechnical incidents by
examining the overall characteristics of this subset in
relation to the time of day and the day of the week they
took place in order to uncover any underlying trends in
incident occurrence. Initially, the effect of the time of
day and day of the week were tested by univariable ana-
lysis, before both factors were considered together in a
multivariable analysis. Chi-squared and Fisher’sE x a c t
tests were used to analyse the differences in the propor-
tions of total incidents which were sociotechnical by day
of the week, and by the reported time (08.00 to 18.00
were considered as normal working hours on both
weekdays and weekends). A multivariable analysis was
then conducted using a backwards stepwise logistic
regression to analyse these factors simultaneously and to
consider potential interactions.
Approvals and permissions
All patient and staff names were removed at the data
extraction stage in order to maintain anonymity. The
survey was approved by the clinical audit department at
the hospital.
Results
Over a five month period a total of 485 medication inci-
dent reports were collected. The average number of
incidents reported per day was 3.2 equating to an aver-
age of 23 per week. Two incidents had fatal outcomes
(occurrence of these incidents was not directly attribu-
ted to cause of death) and a further five were classed as
‘near misses’ (i.e. incidents that had the potential to
cause harm, but were prevented). This term was either
used by the reporters themselves, or the reporter
described an incident fitting the definition.
Description of incidents
Out of a total of 485 reported incidents, 85% (n = 412)
were unrelated to the presence of the electronic pre-
scribing system within the medication use process (i.e.
part of the whole general process from prescribing to
administration or supply of medicines) and thus were
not connected to the introduction of ICT in the study
hospital. These included incidents that were associated
with ward/ department drug stock or the supply of
medicines to wards/ departments (n = 158, 32.6%), the
administration of medicines (n = 123, 25.4%) and a
group of a wide range of infrequently occurring inci-
dents (27%, n = 131) which were related to controlled
drugs/ narcotics, staff communication, patient identifica-
tion, omissions, adverse reactions and infusion equip-
ment. Fifteen per cent (n = 73) were distinguished as
sociotechnical issues, representing the third highest
category of all reported incidents, and thus may be
unique to hospitals that have such ICT systems in place.
These sociotechnical incidents were further analysed
and subdivided into categories in order to identify
aspects of the context which gave rise to adverse situa-
tions and which present possible risks to patient safety.
￿ Incidents related to missing electronic signatures
on administration
This category, which accounted for 49% (n = 36) of
the sociotechnical incidents, describes incidents in
which electronic signatures were not recorded
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the patient’s medication records. On some occasions,
the nurse who was called to account for the lack of
electronic signature stated that she or he had placed
t h ee l e c t r o n i cs i g n a t u r e ,b u tt h a ti th a dn o tr e g i s -
tered on the system. These incidents were usually
identified by staff coming on duty after the omission
of signature took place. They responded in the fol-
lowing ways: they checked with the member of staff
responsible for drug administration whether the
drug had been given. However, they were not able to
verify administration or omission on all occasions. In
some incidents, staff had been told that the nurse
responsible for the administration believed that an
electronic signature had indeed been placed after the
medicine had been given to the patient, but had not
registered on the system and they therefore
described it as a technical problem. In other cases,
the lack of electronic signature was interpreted as
signifying that the medicine had not been given to
the patient and the medication was administered as
if it had previously been omitted. With regard to the
latter, on some occasions the patient or a relative
spotted the potential for a double administration
a n di n f o r m e dt h en u r s ea b o u tt oa d m i n i s t e rt h e
medication; in other cases a double administration
occurred and was discovered in retrospect. Although
this type of incident could be defined as a technical
lapse, which would make it eligible for the following
category of incidents which are related to technical
slips and lapses, we have categorised it separately
because of the relatively large number of this type of
incident reported.
￿ Incidents related to technical slips or lapses dur-
ing the prescribing or administration process
Twenty three incidents (31%) were of this type, in
which an error occurred within the prescribing or
administration part of the process; in other words,
they happened as a direct result of the system being
used in the clinical environment, and would not
have occurred in the same way, using traditional
paper-based prescribing and administration systems.
They are not a reflection on the system’s technical
quality, but indicate that it introduces the potential
for new technical slips and lapses.
This heterogeneous category of incidents included
problems with (1) the user interface (pick list error
where an incorrect drug was selected from the drop
down menu, errors related to intravenous and ent-
eral feed infusion rates, confusion over the prescrip-
tion of required therapy in electronic format, and
inappropriate use of free-text type-in drug leading to
wrong default for route of administration of medi-
cine); (2) treatment duplication, where the same
medicine was prescribed both regularly and as ‘once
only’ resulting in two doses being given, or nearly
given, close together in time; this was the result of
either moving from paper based to electronic pre-
scribing or an over-reliance on the clinical decision
support to highlight a potential for treatment dupli-
cation; (3) alerts causing a distraction and interrup-
tion of workflow, leading to the incorrect medicines
being given to a patient; and (4) the log-in/ log-on
process which led to a prescribed dose being signed
off electronically by a nurse who was still logged
onto the system while it had actually been given by
another nurse who was not logged on.
￿ Incidents related to training
Four incidents were training related (5.5%) and
involved new users, such as junior doctors being
unfamiliar with how to prescribe a particular infu-
sion; agency nurses who were not trained in using
PICS and unable to access an appropriately trained
staff nurse, leading to the omission of drugs; and
staff being unable to carry out administrative tasks
on PICS out of hours. One of the incident report
narrative described how the reporter felt very “let
down” by what he or she felt was a “poor electronic
prescribing system” and the consequence was that a
patient missed an important drug. This is an exam-
ple of where a prescriber was unable to use the sys-
tem to carry out an action that the system was
indeed designed to perform. Another training issue
was identified in an incident that involved enteral
feeding regimes. Nurses on the ward were confused
that the electronic system stated ‘continuous’ indi-
cating no break in feed administration, resulting in
the patient being given too much enteral feed. An
annotation had been placed on the system, but had
not been acted upon. The manner in which these
incidents were reported suggests that the reporter
was more likely to blame the prescribing system
than to identify their own lack of knowledge or lack
of practice of using it.
￿ Incidents related to a mixed economy of pre-
scribing systems
Eight incidents (11%) were identified which related
to both electronic and paper-based systems of pre-
scribing being used for a patient being treated in dif-
ferent areas of the hospital, resulting in near misses,
the omission of medication, or doses being given too
close together. This mixed economy also caused pro-
blems in communication between departments and
individual clinicians. The critical point at which
errors occurred was the handover of patients from
non-PICS areas to PICS areas. For example, an
allergy to penicillin was documented on paper in the
emergency department, but was not transferred to
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to the ward. The lack of this information being tran-
scribed across to PICS meant that a penicillin-like
antibiotic was prescribeda n dt h ep a t i e n th a da n
allergic reaction. Paper persistence also played a part
in facilitating an error in which a doctor changed a
prescription for an antibiotic from an intravenous to
an oral route while the nurses were preparing the
intravenous medicines, working from a paper print-
out of the old prescription. The result was that the
patient received an oral as well as an intravenous
dose before the error was spotted.
￿ Incidents related to prescribing privileges
Two incidents (2.7%) involved prescribing privileges
on PICS. In one incident, a member of medical staff
was unable to prescribe a required medication due
to access rights for the system, leading to the patient
not receiving treatment. The incident report tran-
scription indicated that the staff member believed
that the restrictions imposed by the system were too
confining and resulted in “poor patient care”.T h e
second incident involved a junior nurse being unable
to change the rate of intravenous fluid administra-
tion on the system, a task that has to be carried out
by a registered, PICS trained nurse, resulting in the
actual administration being correct, but not being
registered on PICS.
Effects of time and days of the week on sociotechnical
incidents
Given the scarcity of evidence about medication inci-
dents that may have been an unintended consequence
of the introduction of the electronic prescribing system,
we further explored the characteristics of these inci-
dents. The proportions of reported incidents which were
sociotechnical were compared over different parts of the
week and times of the day. The proportion of sociotech-
nical incidents occurring within office working hours
(08:00 - 18:00 inclusive on both weekdays and week-
ends) were compared to the proportion occurring out-
side this period. A Fisher’s Exact test showed no
significant difference (p = 0.892) suggesting that inci-
dents occurring outside office hours were no more likely
to be sociotechnical than those occurring at other times.
To illustrate this graphically, the sociotechnical incidents
were plotted by time and day. This demonstrated no
strong clustering of incidents, giving no reason to sus-
pect that any systematic issues were occurring. A num-
ber of incidents did not have a recorded time (10%) and
were therefore not included in figure 1.
As well as illustrating how the frequencies of socio-
technical incidents change over time, figure 2 also
shows how the proportion of incidents of this type
changed over the days of the week. These data indicate
that the number of sociotechnical incidents being
reported was not constant over the week. A Chi squared
test was conducted in order to test the significance of
this observation. The result gave evidence that the pro-
portion of reported incidents which were sociotechnical
w a sn o tt h es a m eo ne v e r yd a y( p=0 . 0 1 3 ) .F i g u r e2
illustrates the proportions of incidents which were
reported on each day of the week that were sociotechni-
cal. This highlights a discrepancy between Sunday and
the remainder of the week.
Multivariable analysis of time and day
Time of day and day of week were then included in a
multivariable analysis in order to detect any underlying
interaction. Both variables were entered into a back-
wards logistic regression, including an interaction term.
The interaction was found to be insignificant, and so
Figure 1 Scatter plot of the time of sociotechnical incidents
occurring during the week.
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Figure 2 Breakdown of the sociotechnical incidents occurring
during the week.
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gave no evidence that the likelihood of an incident
occurring outside office hours being sociotechnical was
different on different days of the week. In the resulting
model, whether an incident occurred out of office hours
was also found to be insignificant, and so this factor was
also removed from the analysis. The final model found
that the day of the week was a significant predictor of
the likelihood of an incident being sociotechnical (p =
0.02). The Odds Ratios showed no significant difference
in the likelihood of an incident being sociotechnical on
Tuesday through to Saturday, in comparison with Mon-
day (p-values 0.28-0.78) as shown in table 1. However,
this was not the case on Sunday - Odds Ratio 2.8 (95%
CI: 1.33-7.67, p = 0.01). Therefore, the conclusion of the
multivariable analysis matched that of the univariable
analysis, in that the day of the week was the only known
factor to have a significant effect on the likelihood of an
incident being sociotechnical, with the greatest propor-
tion of such incidents occurring on a Sunday.
In addition, the total number of sociotechnical and
non-sociotechnical incidents was plotted against the day
of the week on which they occurred. The numbers of
medication prescriptions and administrations on each
day were also plotted to give an indication of how the
level of activity fluctuated over the course of the week.
Figure 3 shows that compared to the rest of the week,
the level of prescribing activity was considerably lower
during the weekend. The frequency of non-sociotechni-
cal incidents (Figure 3a) matched this trend, also falling
to a lower level during Saturday and Sunday. In con-
trast, the frequency of sociotechnical incidents (Figure
3b) increased during the weekend, especially on Sunday.
This discrepancy between prescribing activity and the
frequency of sociotechnical incidents appears to indicate
that the increase in the level of sociotechnical incidents
on a Sunday may be of interest as it coincides with a
reduction in both non-sociotechnical incidents and pre-
scribing activity.
Discussion
Potential for new errors
From descriptive accounts of errors in incident reports we
have been able to identify cases where clinical staff inter-
acting with an electronic prescribing system have been
involved with errors, i.e. sociotechnical incidents. Out of
the total number of incidents reported during the survey
period, sociotechnical incidents form a very modest pro-
portion of all medication incidents error (n = 73 15%), but
are the third highest type of medication errors reported.
The subcategories of sociotechnical incidents require
some added explanation. Half of these related to electro-
n i cs i g n a t u r e sw h i c hm a yn o tb et h a ts u r p r i s i n gg i v e n
that overall the PICS system records 120,000 adminis-
trations every week in the study hospital. Missing signa-
tures in 36 cases reported from approximately 2.5
million administrations represents a tiny proportion of
t h et o t a l .I nt h es a m ew a yt h a tan u r s em a yb ed i s -
tracted on a paper-based system and forget the last step
in the process to sign the chart, this is just as possible
in an electronic system although the open patient record
on the computer screen should reduce rather than com-
pound this error. If nurses get logged out of the system
due to a distraction that takes them away from the com-
puter terminal for a period of time, they will lose any
prompt to sign for that medication. It is suspected that
lapses within the workflow during the administration
process results in discrepancy between the reporter’s
planned action and the system logs. This type of inci-
dent can be regarded as an error substitution, insofar as
such an incident could have occurred equally using a
paper system when a written signature had not been
placed against a prescribed dose. Indeed, environmental
factors such as interruptions during the process of med-
ication administration by colleagues, patients or tele-
phone calls have been suspected of contributing to
medication administration errors [25]. This has been
confirmed by Westbrook et al. [26] who reported that
the occurrence and frequency of interruptions were
Table 1 Multivariable Analysis
95% Confidence Interval for Odds Ratio
Sig. Odds Ratio Lower Upper
Day of the Week 0.020 - - -
Tuesday 0.413 1.446 0.598 3.498
Wednesday 0.520 0.720 0.265 1.957
Thursday 0.776 0.868 0.327 2.301
Friday 0.276 0.549 0.187 1.613
Saturday 0.382 0.600 0.191 1.884
Sunday 0.031 2.800 1.101 7.124
Constant 0.000 0.185 - -
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failures and clinical errors. However, whereas incidents
related to the omission of signatures against the admin-
istration of paper-based prescriptions were rarely quan-
tified, PICS renders these incidents visible. This
heightened visibility makes the suspected omission of
medicines amenable to intervention to help mitigate
potential harm to patients associated with missed or
multiple doses. It also has the potential to be used as an
instrument to monitor staff behaviour.
 
Figure 3 Frequency of total number of medication administrations and prescriptions for (a) non sociotechnical incidents and (b)
sociotechnical incidents.
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different types of incidents, but most could be consid-
ered to be technical slips - for example pick list errors,
or administering under the wrong log-in. These types of
errors are undoubtedly only seen due to the presence of
an ICT system, but are not unique to the study hospital,
and are well described in the literature as the unin-
tended consequences of ICT [7,9]. Errors that can be
attributed to a lack of knowledge about the system
formed only a small proportion of the sociotechnical
incidents. However, there tends to be an absence of self-
awareness around lack of knowledge and competence
with regard to prescribing by junior doctors [27].
Paper persistence in institutions with ICT systems has
also been implicated in sociotechnical incidents in other
reports in the literature [28,29]. The problem of paper per-
sistence was manifest in two forms: first, through a mixed
economy of prescribing systems in the same organisation
where the roll out of the electronic prescribing system
across the hospital has not been completed. Inevitably,
when there is the possibility for two parallel systems to
interact, there is the potential for errors to arise where
these systems contradict, or fail to align. The second pro-
blem relates to paper use as a cognitive aid and temporary
display device for information, resulting in a lack of align-
ment between the electronic system and established paper
based work practices that staff have adopted locally to
organise their work load. In the study hospital, it is made
clear to all users that the PICS’ prescribing record is the
primary record for prescription and medication adminis-
tration. Errors such as this would not have occurred if the
policy of using the electronic prescribing system as the pri-
mary of source of medication documentation had been
followed. However, this finding might indicate a need for
an improvement in the design of the PICS to better sup-
port clinical work by eliminating the need for a paper pro-
cess, or by increasing the number of terminals or portable
devices available to staff in clinical areas.
Restricted privileges exist within the system in order
to reduce the risk of errors with high-risk medicines, or
from untrained staff. Both privilege-related incidents did
not result in harm, but in one report it is possible to
infer from the description that despite being untrained
in intravenous administration (and therefore not having
the privileges to document these activities within the
PICS system), the nurse in question did alter intrave-
nous medication notwithstanding the restrictions. This
was not actually a technical violation as in this case
there was no possibility of working around the restric-
tions within the system. However, clear breaches of sys-
tems designed to promote safety need to be examined
to ascertain whether underlying them were social, orga-
nisational or work flow factors influencing ‘work-
around’ behaviour. Such evidence will inform system
design and training. Violations of system restrictions
which compromise patient safety will require policies to
curb this practice when necessary.
Timings and frequency of potential new errors
The evaluation of sociotechnical incidents by time of day
and day of week suggests a trend for increased propor-
tions of these types of incidents occurring on Sundays,
this being almost three times as common as other days of
the week. This is an interesting finding and there are sev-
eral possible explanations. The staff at weekends may not
be representative of those usually working in the hospital
during the week. It is possible that there is an increased
proportion of agency or temporary staff working at week-
ends who are less familiar with the electronic systems.
However, the specificity of Sundays, rather than both
days of the weekend, weakens this argument. It is also
possible that this effect relates to the presence of fewer
technical, pharmacy, senior clinical or managerial staff on
duty on Sundays who, at least in many circumstances,
could deal with some of the incidents reported before
they actually became adverse incidents. There may be
other unexplained reasons for the increased proportions
of sociotechnical incidents, including changes in the pat-
tern of the non-sociotechnical incidents which affect the
denominator, for example, because the pharmacy is
closed, thus artificially inflating the proportion. There-
fore, this increased proportion may be the result of a
combination of different factors including fewer staff on
duty and reliance on temporary staff. We would have
expected similar results during other out-of-hours times,
which was not the case. However, given the under-
reporting of medication incidents and the likelihood of
inaccuracies in the data provided by reporters about the
exact time and date the incident took place, these find-
ings must be treated with caution.
Limitations
The sample consisted of reported incidents only; the
actual (including unreported) number of incidents for
this period of time is unknown. It is widely recognised
that most medication errors are not reported [30,31].
However, it is reasonable to assume that incidents are
r e p o r t e da tan a t i o n a l l yc o m p a r a b l er a t ea tt h es t u d y
hospital [24] and therefore the patterns emerging in this
data set are likely to be transferable. We also acknowl-
edge the limitations of conducting quantitative analyses
of data extracted from incident reports given the under-
reporting of safety incidents. As discussed, although
incident reporters are asked to provide the time and
date the incident occurred, it is possible that reporters
give the time and date the incident was identified or
entered onto the incident reporting system, thus inad-
vertently providing inaccurate data.
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Page 9 of 11This was a single-site, short term study, focusing on
an organisation that has developed its own electronic
prescribing system, and our results are therefore not
directly applicable to other sociotechnical systems. It is
important to consider further analysis which could be
conducted to examine coalescing factors such as fre-
quency of drug rounds during specific times, and also
note that in analysing reported incidents in particular
there may be a lag in the time the incident occurred
and the time the incident has been reported leading to
failures in memory and inaccuracies. In the context of a
critical absence of empirically tested models for achiev-
ing large scale change to improve patient safety, evi-
dence is needed to increase our understanding of why
some organisations successfully implement ICT sup-
ported work practices while others fail [32]. Thus more
attention needs be given on how these results scale up
and this will require multi-site studies. On the other
hand, Greenhalgh et al [14] conclude that further
detailed study of the often hidden clinical work that is
carried out by nurses, junior medical staff and health
care assistants - which Ellingsen and Monteiro [33] refer
to as ‘situated micro-practices’ is needed in order to
generate knowledge about how ICT can be designed to
fit into collaborative clinical practice and team commu-
nication. This study of medication incidents related to
the sociotechnical context has shed some light on these
‘situated micro-practices’.
Conclusions
This study reports on the analysis of medication inci-
dents at a large acute hospital over a period of five
months. We were specifically interested in errors in the
processes of prescribing and administering medication to
in-patients involving the electronic prescribing system.
From descriptive accounts provided by the reporters of
incidents, we have been able to identify cases where clini-
cal staff interacting with the system have been involved
with errors, i.e. sociotechnical incidents. These form a
modest proportion of all medication errors, but they indi-
cate that introducing an electronic prescribing system has
the potential to give rise to new types of risks to patient
safety. These included pick list juxtaposition errors; the
confusion generated by a mixed economy of paper-based
and electronic prescription systems; uncertainty as to
whether patients have received a dose of their medication
as the responsible nurse’se l e c t r o n i cs i g n a t u r ew a sn o t
recorded on the system; and distractions and interrup-
tions to workflows caused by features such as the timing
out of log-ons. Being aware of these types of errors is
important to the clinical and technical implementers of
such systems in order to, where possible, design out
unintended problems, highlight training requirements,
and revise clinical practice protocols.
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